198 Sundays: The Gamble Of People Power

Corazon Aquino is being mourned after she finally succumbed to cancer 23 years after the nonviolent revolution she (and to a certain extent her late husband) was a part of:

Aquino rose to prominence after the assassination in 1983 of her husband, opposition leader Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino Jr.

A housewife who was reluctantly thrust into power, Aquino struggled in office to meet high public expectations. Her land redistribution program fell short of ending economic domination by the landed elite, including her own family. Her leadership, especially in social and economic reform, was often indecisive, leaving many of her closest allies disillusioned by the end of her term.

Still, the bespectacled, smiling woman in her trademark yellow dress remained beloved in the Philippines, where she was affectionately referred to as "Tita (Auntie) Cory."

"Our lives have not improved that much," said Olazo, the laborer. "But if Tita Cory did not restore democracy, I will not even be free to talk this much today."

You probably don't get much out of the capsule history our media provides, so here's what Bobet Corral wrote earlier this year of the People Power revolution:

The people’s movement towards active nonviolence (Alay Dangal) in the Philippines had its beginnings in 1984 – or during the social turmoil which resulted after the assassination of Ninoy Aquino – through a series of seminars conducted by Jean Goss and Hildegard Goss-Mayr. The couple Jean and Hilde are well-known personalities in the methods of active nonviolence that effected social and political change through nonviolent means in Europe, South America and Africa. They are affiliated with Netherlands- based International Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR).

In the early 80's after the assassination of Ninoy Aquino, AKKAPKA trained hundreds of individuals from different sectors of society including politicians, business people, religious, squatter communities, media people, professionals, students, labor unions, and many more. AKKAPKA with a staff of nine set to work building base communities and giving in-depth seminars on active nonviolence.

In 1985, the movement grew in strength with Bishops from the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) also participating in the seminars and reflecting on the Christian and humanistic response to the violence that marked the unjust and dictatorial rule of the late resident Ferdinand Marcos. The CBCP would later issue pastoral letters calling for active nonviolence and civil disobedience to seek an end to the Marcos dictatorship.

As the movement grew in strength and numbers, many leaders of cause-oriented groups, the clergy and ordinary Filipino citizens heeded the call of Cory Aquino and the Catholic Bishops for nonviolent protests which culminated in the peaceful EDSA People Power revolution in 1986. This fateful event happened because like Ninoy in 1983, Martin Luther King in the US in the 1960s, Mahatma Gandhi in India in the 1930-40s, and Jesus two thousand years ago, hundreds of thousands of Filipinos for one shining moment in their history took a stand and offered their lives in the struggle to restore justice, peace and democracy to the Filipino nation.

Movements frequently gather steam in the wake of violent repression.  People were galvanized, rather  than cowed, by the Boston Massacre, the Amritsar Massacre, and even the Kent State Massacre.  Neither Ninoy Aquino's assassination in 1983 nor the Escalante Massacre in 1985 stemmed the rebellious tide.

And that revolultion was amazing:

The overthrow of the Marcos dictatorship remains one of the world's more remarkable nonviolent uprisings.  Despite more than a dozen similar successful movements during the subsequent years in South Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe, the Philippine "people power" revolution remains one of the most impressive in terms of the numbers of people involved, the level of nonviolent discipline and the way it capture the imagination of observers around the world.

President Ferdinand Marcos, who had ruled under dictatorial powers since 1972, had ordered a snap election in February 1986 as a means of legitimizing his control.  When it became apparent that the election had effectively been stolen, the opposition called for a massive campaign of civil disobedience.  However, in the international media, quotes were placed around the word "nonviolent," implying a dubious assessment, or at the least a skeptical outlook, of the strategy or its significance. 

Even after Marcos fled, there was difficulty in the foreign press in describing exactly what happened.  An editorial in Asiaweek noted that "political scientists will have to come up with new words to describe the four-days' wonder that convulsed Manilia...the whole phenomenon...fits no standard category."  Similarly, on the left, there was widespread skepticism over the prospects of success, prompting Cory Aquino to state that "Those who are prepared to support armed struggles for liberation elsewhere discredit themselves if they obscure the nature of what we are doing peacefully here."

The Filipinos could have reacted completely passively, just accepting the old dictatorship and the games Marcos played in stealing the snap election.  Or they could have opted for violence.  Instead, they doubled their chance of victory by resisting nonviolently:

Our findings [using data on major resistance campaigns from 1900 to 2006] show that major nonviolent campaigns have achieved success 53 percent of the time, compared with 26 percent for violent resistance campaigns.

There are two reasons for this success. First, a campaign’s commitment to nonviolent methods enhances its domestic and international legitimacy and encourages more broad-based participation in the resistance, which translates into increased pressure being brought to bear on the target. Recognition of the challenge group’s grievances can translate into greater internal and
external support for that group and alienation of the target regime, undermining the regime’s main sources of political, economic, and even military power.

Second, whereas governments easily justify violent counterattacks against armed insurgents, regime violence against nonviolent movements is more likely to backªre against the regime. Potentially sympathetic publics perceive violent militants as having maximalist or extremist goals beyond accommodation, but they perceive nonviolent resistance groups as less extreme, thereby
enhancing their appeal and facilitating the extraction of concessions through bargaining...We assert that nonviolent resistance is a forceful alternative to political violence that can pose effective
challenges to democratic and nondemocratic opponents...

There is never a guarantee of success in any endeavor, nor is there such a thing as a risk-free revolution.  Yet I'd rather use a combination of the 198 different tactics we cover here as part of a strategic nonviolence campaign than picking up the proverbial pitchforks and torches.

Just look at the odds.  Violence dramatically favors the house.  If you if you go with nonviolence most of the time you beat the house and walk away from the table much, much richer.

ntodd

Covered on previous Sundays:

THE METHODS OF NONVIOLENT PROTEST AND PERSUASION  

1. Public Speeches
2. Letters of opposition or support
5. Declarations of indictment and intention
6. Group or mass petitions
8. Banners, posters, and displayed communications
9. Leaflets, pamphlets, and books
10. Newspapers and journals
11. Records, radio, and television
14. Mock awards
15. Group lobbying
18. Displays of flags and symbolic colors
19. Wearing of symbols
21. Delivering symbolic objects
22. Protest disrobings
23. Destruction of own property
25. Displays of portraits26. Paint as protest
30. Rude gestures
31. "Haunting" officials
32. Taunting officials
33. Fraternization
34. Vigils
35. Humorous skits and pranks
37. Singing
38. Marches
44. Mock funerals
45. Demonstrative funerals.
50. Teach-ins
52. Silence
53. Renouncing honors
54. Turning one's back.
55. Social boycott

THE METHODS OF SOCIAL NONCOOPERATION

57. Lysistratic nonaction
61. Boycott of social affairs
62. Student strike
65. Stay-at-home
66. Total personal noncooperation

THE METHODS OF ECONOMIC NONCOOPERATION

71. Consumers' boycott
86. Withdrawal of bank deposits
88. Refusal to pay debts or interest
90. Revenue refusal
91. Refusal of a government's money
97. Protest strike
112. Reporting "sick" (sick-in)
113. Strike by resignation
117. General strike
118. Hartal

THE METHODS OF POLITICAL NONCOOPERATION

120. Withholding or withdrawal of allegiance
122. Literature and speeches advocating resistance
124. Boycott of elections
135. Popular nonobedience
137. Refusal of an assemblage or meeting to disperse
140. Hiding, escape, and false identities
147. Deliberate inefficiency and selective noncooperation by enforcement agents
148. Mutiny
150. Noncooperation by constituent governmental units

THE METHODS OF NONVIOLENT INTERVENTION

158. Self-exposure to the elements
159. The fast: a) Fast of moral pressure; b) Hunger strike; c) Satyagrahic fast
160. Reverse trial
162. Sit-in
164. Ride-in
170. Nonviolent invasion
171. Nonviolent interjection
173. Nonviolent occupation
174. Establishing new social patterns
177. Speak-in
178. Guerrilla theater
179. Alternative social institutions
180. Alternative communication system
189. Selective patronage
193. Overloading of administrative systems
195. Seeking imprisonment
196. Civil disobedience of "neutral" laws
198: Dual sovereignty and parallel government.

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